Monday 25 March 2013

Kenya: African Court's Historic Ruling on Ogiek Tribe in Kenya

The African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights ruled on 15 March that the government of Kenya must not evict the Ogiek from their land in the Mau Forest.

The ruling states that in the opinion of the African Court 'there exists a situation of extreme gravity and urgency, as well as a risk of irreparable harm to the Ogiek Community with regard to violation of their rights guaranteed under the charter ...'

The Court ordered the government to reinstate restrictions it had imposed on land transactions in the Mau forest, while it reaches a decision on issue.

The news was welcomed by the Ogiek, who have seen much of their forest home destroyed by illegal settlers and loggers. Joseph Sang an Ogiek spokesman told Survival, 'It's a sigh of relief yet again for indigenous peoples in the African context. We are all supportive of any move that will deliver justice to the Ogiek people.'

Forest Beekeepers

New 'conservation' measures threaten Kenya's Ogiek tribe with eviction from their forest home.

The Ogiek are hunter-gatherers, and the Mau forest with its rich diversity of wildlife and forest produce such as wild honey, is vital for their livelihood and survival.

Joseph Lesingo, an Ogiek hunter told Survival 'According to our history we are the indigenous people living in Mau forest. Without forest we cannot survive. We gather fruits from forest, we collect honey from the forest, and we hunt wild animals, and that is how we survive.

According to the Minority Rights Group, which with the Ogiek Peoples Development Programme (OPDP) and Centre for Minority Rights (CEMIRIDE) brought the case to the court, 'This is the first time the African Court, in operation since 2006, has intervened to protect the rights of an indigenous community.

Liberia: Towards Constitutional Reform in Liberia

Analysis

A new constitution that sets and sustains a foundation for democratic governance and provides for a balanced distribution of power is the solution to the governance and developmental challenges of the Liberian state

INTRODUCTION

Liberia's emergence from collapse to a fragile state status has been a marked achievement of the collective efforts of progressive forces in the country - the civil society, political actors and the Government of Liberia.
The local civil society has taken the lead to advocate and monitor efforts at peacebuilding and democratic governance.

While the present administration continues to engage international partners on the need for increased aid in security and reconstruction, local state-driven efforts towards good governance and democratization cannot be overemphasized in the process of sustaining the peace and stability in the aftermath of international presence and aid to Liberia.

In the process of state building, constitution making is a key issue that sets the foundation for democratic governance and the rule of law. If political uprisings and violent conflicts in Liberia were caused by poor governance and unaddressed popular grievances then constitutional interventions were needed immediately after the cessation of hostilities in 2003.

Ten years after the the civil war and eight years after the reestablishment of constitutional order, a process of constitutional reform has been initiated by the current regime towards which the Constitution Review Committee has been appointed to lead a process of reviewing the 1986 constitution and draft propositions for amendment.

This article is an analysis of constitutional reform in Liberia and a contribution to the popular debate on the way forward. This article argues that a new Constitution that sets and sustains a foundation for democratic governance and provides for a balanced distribution of power is the solution to the governance and developmental challenges of the Liberian state.

CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF LIBERIA

The first constitution of Liberia dates back to 1847. This constitution essentially had several characteristics relevant to addressing the governance and security challenges of that era.

It can be said that the constitution was highly protective against the wave of colonialism and imperialism in Africa, and was at the same time imposing a pattern of settler-colonialism on the local indigenous population.

It also included from its originality a bill of rights that guaranteed the fundamental rights of the citizens of Liberia.

In 1980, the constitution was suspended after a military coup that toppled the over 100 years of Americo-Liberian rule. Before then, the 1847 Constitution had gone through several amendments addressing emerging issues that had required constitutional interventions.

After the suspension of the 1847 Constitution, the military ruled by decree and in 1984 a commission was set up to draft a new constitution for Liberia.

The Constitution Commission's strategy of public dialogue on key issues opened up the space for the Liberian people to make choices on the form and nature of governance they preferred. The greatest aspiration of the people was to have a broad based participatory governance that gave more power to the people and reduced the 'imperial presidency'.

These aspirations were captured in the provisions drafted by the commission. Unfortunately, most of those provisions - particularly those that sought to reduce the powers of the president - were eliminated or revised by another body set up by the head of state called the Constitutional Advisory Assembly.

In the end, the Liberian people went to a referendum to adopt a constitution presented by the Assembly against no other alternative (See Sawyer 2005).

A real opportunity of providing for a responsive and participatory democratic governance in Liberia was available in the transition years following the coup, and this could have been done through the establishment of viable constitutional order.

However, this opportunity was missed. This was because the head of the military junta had a personal interest in becoming president, thus he had to ensure that any new constitutional arrangement would protect him and his associates.

It is therefore obvious that what Liberia has today is a constitution with vague provisions and one that overly concentrates power in the hands of the president, including provisions that grants blanket amnesty to members of the military junta that led the 1980 coup.

The failure or inability of the government emerging from the 1985 elections to establish constitutional order and the inherent limitations of the 1986 Constitution in providing for self-governance and democratic participation at all levels promoted and entrenched the culture of 'imperial presidency' even after the fall of the True Whig Party hegemony.

What followed was a catastrophic civil war during which the constitution was suspended on several occasions to provide for a governing order that accommodated all actors in the conflict - transitional and factionalized arrangements. This was a means of ceasing or managing the wars, rather than solving the problems and resolving the conflicts afflicting Liberia.

Since the end of the conflict, there has been no substantial effort to address the constitutional crises facing Liberia. The referendum of 2011 was a minimalist and selfish effort of the sitting regime.
It ignored the key issues that needed to be addressed to solve the governance challenges facing Liberia through constitutional interventions. The referendum was focused on protecting the interests of officials to hold positions under certain circumstances not guaranteed under the 1986 Constitution.
For example, the sitting president was deemed unfit for rerun under the requirement for residency; therefore, a fast tracked change in the residency requirement that favours the president and several members of the political elite was needed before the October 2011 elections.

The intentions of the political leaders that railroaded the 2011 referendum was not too different from that of the PRC members during the drafting of the 1986 Constitution.

Those intentions can obviously be analyzed as manipulating the constitution as a means of perpetuating themselves in power and protecting themselves and wielding more powers in the presidency through the constitution.

Other issues on the 2011 referendum were the election of members of the legislature on simple majority, an increase in the retirement age for justices of the Supreme Court, and an adjustment in the time for presidential and general elections.

These issues were logically inconsequential to the social and political crises facing the people of Liberia, thus they were denied by the people. What followed were a series of machinations and a smothering of the 1986 constitution revealing the kind of strongman/woman politics that have plagued Liberia and many other African countries for years.

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: LEAKAGE OF THE ACCRA PEACE AGREEMENT

The comprehensive peace agreement was another lost opportunity on constitutional reform in Liberia. Most nations that experience such civil and political breakdowns address constitutional issues before the return to civilian democratic rule and the restoration of viable constitutional order.

In most cases, like Kenya and Zimbabwe, transitional arrangements lead the constitution reform process; the population votes on a new constitution and then elections for a new government are held. The new government is formed based on the approved constitution and governs through it principles and provisions.

Liberia's political actors and the international community deliberately ignored, or fell short of considering, constitutional reform as a critical element of transitional processes that facilitate state reconstruction. Several other interests topped the table at the peace conference.
Warring factions were concerned with securing seats in a power-sharing deal and a general amnesty, among other concerns. Political parties and civil society took on accountability issues, ceasefire, disarmament, elections and the restoration of order.

The international community's primary concern was a halt to violence and the return of peace, stability and humanitarian services. No party pushed constitutional reform as a key concern during the peace conference that made way for the transitional period of 2003 - 2005.

Like other previous arrangements, the constitution was suspended to allow for a factionalized transitional government inclusive of warring factions, political parties and the civil society movement.

The lesson Liberian political actors have not yet learned is that if a constitution is continuously suspended, then that constitution is the problem, and until it is remade or reformed, there will be crises.

The 1986 Constitution of Liberia has proven to be the problem, and in addition to its weaknesses of providing for a broad based participatory governance, its provisions institutionalize predatory governance and power abuse. Provisions that promote good governance and democratic practices are even undermined by other provisions that support imbalance distribution of power and over-centralization.

NEED TO REFORM CONSTITUTION

 The 1986 Constitution is not a completely flawed or outdated constitution. It includes several provisions that are relevant and wanting in every democratic environment. Chapter Two and Three are outstanding sections that every democratic society craves.

Its fundamental weaknesses lie in the fact that it does not lay a foundation for state building and also did not provide for effective distribution of power that ensures checks and balances between the people and their elected leaders and/or representatives. This is why it has become problematic over the years.

It also does not provide for strong institution building. It is institutions that enforce rules and once institutions are flawed in themselves, it becomes difficult to ensure proper interpretation and enforcement of rules. The need therefore to set rules and build institutions for their enforcement through a constitutional process has become imperative to state reconstruction in Liberia.
Key issues have emerged in post conflict Liberia and they can only be addressed through a constitutional reform process. For example, political and social discourses in Liberia have focused over the last few years on, but not limited to, the following (1) citizenship - who is a Liberian and who is not?
Should a person with Liberian citizenship be allowed to carry citizenship of another or more countries? (2)

Government Decentralization - there is a convincing case that Liberia needs a decentralized governance system to break the chain of 'imperial' presidency and centrally-controlled national body-polity to provide for an effective participation of the people in local self-governance and social economic development; (3) Property rights - land ownership, tenure security and distribution is a critical issue in post conflict Liberia and the constitution will have to be clear on property rights: for example who owns the land, the trees on the land, and the resources beneath the land?

This issue as addressed in the 1986 constitution is perceived to be frequently abused by the state when expropriating land from the people.

The current political and social dynamics in Liberia have given compelling reasons for a thorough look at the current constitutional arrangement.

The current constitution does not sufficiently answer the looming political and social questions. In addition to these limitations, it is the key guarantor of the predatory and imperial nature of the Liberian presidency. Thus it has caused massive abuse of power in all branches of government.

Constitutional cases have emerged under the current administration, and the opinions of the Supreme Court have been greeted with rancor and grudgingly accepted.
One particular Supreme Court opinion passed in 2007 allowing for the President of Liberia to appoint mayors of cities did not only undermine the popular aspiration of the people towards democratic local self-governance, but reinforced the 'imperial' powers of the presidency on the local people.

DEBATES ON CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

Sustainable constitutional reform needs to take place in consideration of the popular opinions of the Liberia people on a range of issues and problems facing the individual citizen, the local communities and the state.
A national debate therefore on the issues needs to gain traction and be framed in context to inform constitutional reforms. Over the years, there have been popular positions on reforming the constitutions of 1986.

 While most of the debates have been limited to selected provisions, new arguments have emerged on the totality of the constitution.

One school of thought believes that the entire constitution needs to be remade. For this group of people, a referendum on selected provisions cannot address the range of constitutional problems facing the country, and that other issues on which the 1986 constitution is silent need to be addressed clearly.

Thus they propose that a new constitution be written and submitted for popular debate and a referendum. On the other hand, a second group believes that the constitution must be held in its present originality and be submitted for a referendum on provisions considered inconsistent, outdated or impractical to the reality of today or provisions that do not move in cadence with emerging social and development issues.

These two debates have merits and demerits in other ways, but the common consensus is that no matter what position is taken, there is a need to review the 1986 constitution and set it on course with contemporary realities.

This needs, however, to be done in a way that addresses the problems facing the people of Liberia and facilitates the realization of their collective national aspirations.

THE WAY FORWARD

The way forward is to identify the key problems undermining democratic governance, socio-economic development and peace in Liberia, and open them up for public debates through which the views and aspirations of the Liberian people can be elicited.

It is important to note from the start that the challenges of democratic governance and massive poverty and inequality in Liberia are underpinned by imbalance in distribution of power, inefficient use of resources, corruption, weak protection of property rights, power abuse, and the lack of accountability and transparency in the management of public affairs.

Other issues like citizenship, government decentralization, property rights, national identity and national symbols have risen to the public agenda sparkling controversial debates since the end of the civil war.

These issues, in addition to ones mentioned above, cannot be addressed in the absence of a national endeavor to change the contents of the current constitution and make it effective in the functioning of the state. Amendment of provisions will be a tinkering approach short of solving the problems facing the Liberian state and the people.

A comprehensive process of reforming the Constitution is therefore needed to address these issues in their generic, and all other specific issues can follow through enabling legislations. This means a new Constitution, that includes essential principles and provisions of the current Constitution is needed for Liberia.

The opportunity Liberians have in this constitution remaking process is that there has been popular consensus from the citizenry and competing political actors on the need to review the current constitution and find a way of solving the country's problems through a functional constitutional arrangement.

In addition, a strong will and support from political leaders will accelerate the process of constitutional reform. By the current constitution, the current President of Liberia cannot run for a third term of office.

The fact that this process has begun during her last tenure is an opportunity to have a new constitution free of manipulations and a flawed process that concentrates power at the presidency and give amnesty to individuals who violate humanitarian and human rights laws.

Liberians therefore have an opportunity of leading themselves into a sound constitution making process upon which the pillars of local self-governance and democracy can be sustained.

Thursday 14 March 2013

MPs NOT CONTENTED WITH THE DEPLOYMENT OF 140 UGADNDAN POLICE OFFICERS TO SOMALIA


MPs on the Defense and Internal Affairs committee of parliament have voiced their disquiet about the manner in which 140 Ugandan police officers were deployed to Somalia in August last year without Parliament's approval.

The legislators, although accede that the constitution and the Police Act are 'silent' about deployment of police personnel outside Ugandan borders, contend that parliament should have given its seal of approval to the deployment given its oversight role over the police force.

"Parliament is the one that regulates the police force, but we are not officially aware of your deployment to Somalia," committee chairperson, Milton Muwuma said during an interface with the top brass of Uganda police, including Inspector General of Police, Lt. Gen. Kale Kayihura on Tuesday.

MPs contend that information about the mission became public knowledge when deployed officers started complaining about deductions and late payment of their allowances.

MPs Hussein Kyanjo, Fungaroo Kaps and committee vice chairperson, Simon Mulongo called for the summoning of the sector Minister, James Baba, to parliament to seek mandate for the Somalia mission.

However, Inspector General of Police, Lt. Gen. Kale Kayihura told MPs that the Attorney General had given a legal opinion okaying the deployment without parliamentary assent, thus paving way for Uganda to join Nigeria in sending police personnel to the war-torn country.

"We sought the opinion of the Attorney General and he endorsed the deployment without parliamentary approval. The constitution is not explicit in this circumstance, unlike in instances where the army is deployed outside the country," Kayihura said.

Uganda accepted to send police personnel initially meant for Darfur on the request of African Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) after Sudan declined to grant them visas.

This followed a Memorandum of Understanding between the Ugandan government and the African Union on a host of issues pertaining to the welfare of the personnel to be deployed, funding of the mission and compensation in cases of death and grave injury.

Kayihura justified the USD$200 monthly deductions from their USD$1028 monthly allowances saying, it goes into meeting administrative costs like training.

The Commandant of the police force in Somalia, John Nuwagira said the mission covers only those aspects pertaining to keeping law and order, although in instances where they come under insurgent fire, they are mandated to defend themselves.

Uganda has played an integral role in pacifying Somalia, contributing the first batch of soldiers under AMISOM in 2007.

Uganda has previously deployed its police forces under the auspices of the UN in Liberia, Kosovo, East Timor and Darfur.

JUDICIAL OFFICERS IN BURUNDI GET TRAINING ON EAC INTEGRATION


Judicial officers in Burundi are this week getting trained on the role of the Judiciary in the EAC integration process.

The 11-13 March training at Sun Safari Club in Bujumbura, Burundi, aims to develop and increase knowledge of judicial officers from Partner States on the role of the Judiciary in EAC integration processes and effectively build their participatory capacity therein.
Addressing the judicial officers at the training Ambassador Jean Rigi, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of East African Community Affairs in Burundi said development of the Judiciary is the basis of a socio-economic development of any society.
 
“No country can pretend to achieve sustainable development if it does not have a fair judicial system,” Amb Rigi asserted.
He said the training would be a tool that would offer an opportunity for all the stakeholders to play an active role in the promotion of the Judiciary and its vital role in the EAC integration on one hand; and to participate in the development of the East African Community, on the other.
On his part the Counsel to the Community Hon. Wilbert Kaahwa said the training provides a perfect opportunity to understand the stages of EAC integration, the current status and the role of the East African Court of Justice and the national judiciaries in the integration processes.
 
The EAC official urged the judicial officers to use the forum to devise innovations that would promote efficiency and effectiveness in the judicial systems of the Partner States.

Monday 4 March 2013

'Uhuru Men Bribed Witness 4' - ICC Chief Prosecutor

Bensouda returns Muthaura to Pretrial Court 

ICC Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda yesterday confirmed that she had dropped 'Witness 4' but she simultaneously alleged that he had been bribed by "representatives" of Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta.

Bensouda agreed that the case against Uhuru's co-accused Francis Muthaura should be returned to the pretrial chamber as Witness 4 was the only direct witness against him. But she insisted that the case against Uhuru must proceed to full trial.

On Wednesday Bensouda said she would not object if the start date of the Kenyan trials be changed to August from the present April date.

Bensouda told trial judges yesterday that the controversial witness had confessed to accepting money last May from the alleged Uhuru emissaries to withdraw his testimony.

"Witness 4 revealed in the May 2012 interview that he had been offered, and accepted, money from individuals holding themselves out as representatives of the Accused to withdraw his testimony," she said.

"The witness provided emails and bank records that confirmed the bribery scheme. In light of these cumulative revelations, the Prosecution considers that it is not useful to call him as a witness," Bensouda said.

In his original statements, the witness said he attended meetings on November 26, 2007 at State House; on November 17, 2007 with Uhuru at Yaya Centre; and on January 3, 2008 at the Nairobi Club meeting with Uhuru and Muthaura.

Bensouda said that she still has Witnesses 11 and 12 whose evidence helped the Pre-Trial Chamber to confirm charges of crimes against humanity against Uhuru and Muthaura.

"Even if the pretrial chamber would have discarded Witness 4's evidence in its entirety, the remaining evidence cited in the confirmation decision establishes "substantial grounds to believe" that Mr Kenyatta committed the crimes charged," she said.

According to Bensouda, Witnesses 11 and 12 link Uhuru to the December 30, 2007 State House meeting; the pay-off to secure Maina Njenga's approval for Mungiki to carry out retaliatory attacks; and the funding of the coordinators of the Nakuru and Naivasha violence.

The two witnesses gave evidence that Uhuru instructed the mobilization of attackers and paid an unnamed Mungiki leader to gather a group of Mungiki to replace deserters.

"The findings above go directly to Mr Kenyatta's alleged role in the common plan and the retaliatory attacks that sprang from it. Together, they are more than sufficient to support confirmation of the charges," Bensouda said.

Bensouda admitted a serious error in failing to disclose some exculpatory information in a 28 page affidavit by Witness 4 on September 27, 2010.
 "Witness 4 discussed the Nairobi Club meeting. He stated that the meeting occurred, but whereas Witness 4's ICC statements explained that he attended the meeting in person, in another paragraph of the affidavit stated that he was told about the meeting by a Mungiki member who claimed to have attended. The inconsistency between paragraph 33 of the affidavit and Witness 4's three ICC statements constitutes information that is subject to disclosure," she said.

"The prosecution acknowledges that it erred in not disclosing the affidavit at the pre-trial stage. With the benefit of hindsight, the affidavit could and should have been disclosed to the defence prior to the confirmation hearing, with redactions," she said.

The prosecutor conceded that she may not have a concrete case against Muthaura. "There would not have been sufficient evidence to confirm the charges against Muthaura without Witness 4's evidence," Bensouda said.
"If Muthaura's case is collapsing, is that not an indication even mine will go nowhere?" Uhuru said yesterday in Meru. Uhuru said Bensouda had not opposed his application for postponement of the trial date and Muthaura's plea for his case to be returned to the Pre rial chamber is indicative of a collapsing case.

Uhuru's lawyer Steven Kay said Uhuru and Muthaura are defendants in the same case and therefore Bensouda cannot separate them. "If the Prosecutor has found the case against Muthaura so weak that it must be returned to the pretrial chamber for re-examination, so it must be done for Mr Kenyatta. The two have accused of organizing a "common plan". Yet she has rejected the same request from my client," Kay said.

He said there is no conceivable legal reason why Uhuru's case should now proceed unless it was for political reasons related to the election.

Witness 4 is presumed to be a former member of the Mungiki. He testified before the Waki Commission whose evidence was later handed over to the ICC in 2009. In early 2008, the witness fled to Swaziland.