East African Community had a strong 2014, what next?

OWN VIEW



Yes, there was a discouraging wrangle in the East African Legislative Assembly (Assembly) and yes, al-Shabaab attacks again raised concerns over Kenya's as well as the wider East African Community's security.

But the Community's overall 2014 performance had some positives whose end product impacts on the future of the five-member regional bloc.

The past 12 months saw no violent inter-state conflict and, in a way, the EAC is open for business in 2015. Minus al-Shabaab's terror in Kenya, the relative peace and stability remains critical in attracting investments to the region.

What's more, the recent respite in the Legislative arm of the Community also puts east Africans' minds at ease as EALA is now expected to concentrate and deliver on its legislative responsibilities.
So important was the call by new Speaker, Daniel Kidega, when, after taking charge, vowed to bring unity in a house previously dented by members' disapproval of his predecessor.

The extended wrangle over Margaret Zziwa's alleged abuse of office had threatened to erode east Africans' trust in the House. With new trusted and trusting EALA leadership, hopefully, 2015 will bode well for the region.

The positive and constant hustle and a bustle by the pace setters of the Northern Corridor - Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda - continued to accelerate integration, boost trade, and enhance security.

The trio's initiatives were a beacon of hope, and a sign of what the future probably holds. Among others, looking to cap off 2014 with an 'unforgettable flash,' the leaders of Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and South Sudan, during December's 8th northern corridor integration projects summit, signed an MOU on management of northern corridor air space, among others.

The deal will deliver in the development of the infrastructure for transmission, power trade, and significantly reduce the region's cost of air travel by 40 percent.

The leaders also directed their ministers to expedite ratification of the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) protocol.

The SGR, despite small start-up hitches here and there, as common with nearly all gigantic projects, will in future supplement the bloc's road transport and increase efficiency especially by providing landlocked economies (Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi) a better and faster access to Kenya's maritime port of Mombasa.

With an envisaged high design standard, the $3.6 billion double-track SGR (1,435mm), 1,890 km from Mombasa to Kigali line is expected to transform transport logistics in the region, stimulate economic development and benefit all east Africans.

In February, the EAC issued regulations to enhance the operationalization of the EAC standardization, quality assurance, metrology and testing Act (SQMT), to facilitate regional trade. The regulations, among others, will provide consumer confidence of products traded in the region.

That same month, a new tool, a Scorecard, to assess progress toward developing the EAC Common Market was launched. It measures Partner States' compliance to the free movement of capital, services and goods.

At its launch in Arusha, EAC Secretary General, Amb. Sezibera said: "The scorecard is not about pointing fingers, or apportioning blame. It is about identifying areas where we are doing well and strengthening them".

In 2015 and beyond, the Scorecard will help identify areas where reforms are required to meet expectations in the bloc's integration agenda.

It is expected to also foster peer learning and facilitate the adoption of best practice in the region, thus helping fortify the regional market, grow the private sector and deliver benefits to consumers.

Also, tourism officials from Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, met to mull over thorny issues that afflicted the sector since 2010. That the meeting happened was in itself an achievement.

Outstanding among the issues that the ministers haggled over was that countries were denying entry of tourist vehicles registered in others'; cross border cooperation in wildlife law enforcement; and harassment of driver guides at border crossings; as well as disparities in fees charged. Ironing out these issues will impact on the bloc's tourism sector in 2015 and further.

The urgency and importance of cutting donor dependence was reiterated in 2014. Of the $117.5 million 2013/2014 budget, EAC countries contributed $37.2 million and donors, $79.8 million.

In March, Sezibera urged the Summit to adopt the alternative financing mechanism of 1% of customs revenue as earlier proposed so as to provide for financial solidarity and equity, key tenets of the integration process.

Some countries are now mobilizing domestic resources, either through infrastructure levies, or through setting aside monies from their own budgets," said Sezibera.
"Secondly, because of good macro-economic management, our countries are able to borrow from capital markets. Rwanda has issued bonds. Kenya did the same and Tanzania will do the same".

Furthermore, the March launching of the EAC Payment and Settlement Systems Integration Project (EAC-PSSIP), an important project in light of the proposed East African Monetary Union (EAMU), the third stage of EAC integration, was important.

The US$23 million EAC-PSSIP project aims to enhance convergence and regional integration of payment and settlement systems; strengthen a harmonized legislative and regulatory financial sector; and build capacities in EAC countries.

The project, said Dr. Enos Bukuku, EAC's Deputy Secretary General (Planning and Infrastructure), is a requirement for the development and implementation of secure, efficient, reliable and integrated payment and settlement system to ensure efficient flow of financial transactions within the Monetary Union.

Collaborating on security

When Kenya, a gateway to most landlocked EAC partner states, hurts there is no doubt that others too feel the pain. The pain inflicted by Al-Shabaab militants on Kenya is a threat to Uganda and Rwanda. It was critical, when in October, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda - and Ethiopia - contributed the bulk of a now ready-to-deploy military fighting force of 5,000 troops under the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF).

EPAs

The negotiations on Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the EU that started in 2007 were completed.

It is the first time that the Community negotiated terms of trade with Europe and the deal is better than nothing.

Even though the real benefits to EAC will have to be seen rather than expected, concluding the deal was significant as it ended the long-drawn-out and wearisome process of negotiations.

The deal, it is hoped, will eventually provide legal certainty for businesses and open a long-term perspective for free and unlimited access to the EU market for products from the EAC.

In November, the East African Trade and Investment Hub, a regional programme intended to increase food security and ramp up trade and investment between the US and east Africa was launched.

The Hub, it is hoped, will assist EAC's private sector to engage with government in finding practical solutions to constraints to trade and investment, as well as build awareness around opportunities for African and U.S. firms to increase trade, expand business partnerships, and invest in east Africa.

On December 5, the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor withdrew the case against Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta. Despite a lurking chance the prosecutors may bring back charges, the collapse of the case was a welcome moment for EAC leaders, and citizens, who all the time disagreed with the trial.

Bad news

Yes, the bloc largely stood on the weak side during 2014 and, arguably, apart from the Northern Corridor initiatives whose achievements will ultimately benefit the whole region, little else was really exciting.

For once, the ill of corruption remained a nagging burden. EAC countries generally continued to perform poorly in the fight against corruption with none surpassing the 50 per cent threshold in the latest global corruption perception index by Transparency International (TI). The World Bank's Doing Business 2014 report also paints a damning picture of the regional business climate, with the exception of Rwanda.

A key obstruction in the regional fight against graft is that regional anti-corruption agencies held opposing views on whether to give prosecutorial powers to their respective anti-corruption agencies. The signing of the EAC Protocol on Preventing and Combating Corruption was hampered by such differences.

Beyond 2014, to create jobs, the partner states will need to jointly take further steps to tackle corruption, simplify business regulation and create a vibrant regional common market, among others.

Frosty relations

It remains unclear how the heart of inter-EAC relations will beat after Tanzania and Burundi hold their respective presidential elections, in 2015. But it is clear that regional leaders' relations and camaraderie matter for the integration agenda to thrive.

Without the leaders' amity, a scenario akin to that which led to the EAC's 1977 collapse would, regrettably, be inevitable.

External shocks

Besides other unpredictable socio-economic external or global shocks, the wave of violence and instability in the bloc's shaky neighbors, especially the DR Congo, South Sudan and Somalia, is another cause for concern in 2015 and afar.

Peace and stability in these neighbors would by the same token imply socio-economic gains for the EAC, and vice-versa.

The two-year old tit-for-tat violence in the world's youngest state which seceded from Sudan in 2011, for example, did not only claim thousands of lives, displace thousands others and wreck the nascent oil economy but also directly hit the economies of Uganda and Kenya, some of South Sudan's biggest trading partners.

Apart from the effect on cross-border trade, Uganda sent troops to assist President Salva Kiir against rebels led by his sacked vice-president, Riek Machar, forcing the country into war spending which definitely eats into its development budget.

On the other side, since the Operation Linda Nchi began in 2011, Al-Shabaab vowed retaliation against Kenya. Burundi, which has provided the second largest contingent to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), has also received threats from the militants.

Somalia's insecurity has not only affected its hope of joining the EAC. It hampers EAC's economic progress when the bloc is forced to reinforce security at the expense of entirely focusing and pursuing much needed economic development.

Analysts say that only deepening security cooperation in eliminating al-Shabaab and other security threats can deliver an enormous peace dividend benefiting not only Kenya and Somalia, but also the entire EAC in 2015 and beyond.

The Challenged Life of the Challenger

 ANALYSIS

Uganda's NRM keeps a firm grip on power while opposition parties implode.

In the early years of African independence, military regimes and single-party dictatorships ruled most of the continent's countries. Competitive elections were rare.

From the early 1960s to the end of the 70s, only about 55 elections were held in Africa, averaging three per year, wrote American political scientists Daniel Posner and Daniel Young in 2007 in the Journal of Democracy. Most of these were not competitive, multi-party polls; they were merely referenda that served to endorse autocratic rule.

Incumbent parties and their leaders won all these elections with the exception of Somalia's first president, Aden Abdullah Osman, who lost to Abdirashid Ali Shermarke in 1967. (Mr Osman set the record as the first African president to step down peacefully after serving two terms.)

A slight improvement took place in the 1980s, with about 36 African elections, or 3.6 per year. Only one incumbent party lost, in Mauritius, in 1982.

In the next decade, a wave of democratisation in Eastern Europe set in motion a renewed push for competitive party politics in Africa. From 1990 through to 2005, Africa held more than 100 elections, averaging nearly seven elections each year.

Currently, at least ten elections are held in Africa every year. Yet one constant remains: a weak opposition and dominant ruling parties. The latter still win 80% of all elections held.

Opposition parties' victories in national elections have been few and scattered--in Benin and Zambia in 1991, Ghana in 2000 and 2008, Kenya in 2002, Côte d'Ivoire in 2010, Senegal in 2012, Zambia again in 2012, and Malawi in May 2014.

Uganda is an unambiguous example of a single-party system and a weak and fragmented opposition. The country's experience with multi-party politics is tenuous.

From independence in 1962 to the capture of power by Yoweri Museveni's guerrilla rebels in 1986, only one multi-party election was held: in 1980, when Milton Obote's Uganda People's Congress (UPC) defeated the Democratic Party (DP) and the Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM) in a highly disputed election.

Since 1986, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) has maintained a firm grip on power. Its chairman, Mr Museveni, now 70, will be running for a record fifth five-year term in 2016. Having ruled unelected up to 1996, Mr Museveni's combined stay in power by 2016 will total 30 years, making him one of Africa's longest-ruling authoritarian leaders.

In a rather bloated national legislature of 385 seats, including unelected members of cabinet, the ruling party holds an absolute majority of 295 backed by a few dozen independents. The combined opposition has only 60 members of Parliament (MPs). This dominance is duplicated at the local, district and sub-county levels.

Mr Museveni has exploited legal and extra-legal manoeuvres to cripple opposition to his increasingly authoritarian rule. Shortly after assuming the presidency, he banned political parties for 19 years until a 2005 referendum restored multi-party politics.

Mr Museveni is quick to chide his opponents: "There is no genuine opposition in Uganda," but rather "political careerists and purveyors of falsehoods", he told a victory party in the capital Kampala after the March 2011 elections.

The structure of Uganda's national politics, the historical interplay between society and state and the internal weakness in political parties have crippled the country's opposition. Three factors explain why.

First, much like other African countries with little experience in liberal principles, the ruling NRM continues to promulgate an environment that is hostile to multi-party politics. From Mr Obote's single-party system of the 1960s and Idi Amin's dictatorship in the 70s to Mr Museveni's no-party politics in the 80s and 90s, the military has played a preponderant role and displaced competitive elections.

"In those countries where the military has been a key political player--in Angola, Egypt, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, etc--state resources are deployed to ensure retention of power by the ruling party," said Augustine Ruzindana, deputy secretary-general of the main opposition party, the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC). Thus, "mobilisation, membership recruitment, and fundraising are made impossible or difficult for opposition parties," Mr Ruzindana added.

In Uganda, the state is synonymous with the ruling NRM. The state's coercive machinery is directed at defeating the opposition as witnessed during the 2011 walk-to-work protests against high food and fuel prices.

The NRM and Mr Museveni equate opposition with subversion of the state, making Uganda's political structure fundamentally unprogressive. While in developed democracies official opposition is a government-in-waiting, "in Africa, opposition parties are seen as detractors and enemies of the ruling parties or even the nation," noted Asnake Kefale, a politics professor at Addis Ababa University.
Second, Africa's limited experience with open and competitive politics means long-standing political constituencies are not aligned to clear ideological persuasions, according to Richard Joseph, a political science professor at Northwestern University in the US.
Instead, parties are founded on religious affiliations, regional and ethnic blocs, as was the case with two
 Ugandan parties: the UPC, which is mainly Anglican and based in the east and north; and the DP, largely Catholic and rooted in central Uganda.

Today religion and ethnicity play a less prominent role. But the main opposition party, the FDC, nevertheless lacks a clear-cut political constituency. It is not a party for workers (a very small fraction of the population), the middle class (equally very small), or the peasant masses (who are the majority).

Without a political base, the FDC cannot raise funding from party members. "Most people will find it easier to contribute [to] weddings and burials the year round than contribute on a sustained basis to political party activities," said Mugisha Muntu, a retired army general and now FDC president.

Third, and arguably most important: the state controls material resources in a country where the ruling party is firmly entrenched. Uganda is one of Africa's most privatised and liberalised economies. But the state remains a big business player and indirectly wields a financial whip.

"There is a desk in the Internal Security Organisation that monitors all business activities remotely associated with the opposition," three-time losing presidential candidate, Kizza Besigye, said over lunch in Kampala in July. Such businesses are denied government tenders, targeted by the tax agency and subjected to other crippling government constraints, he said.

For Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, columnist for The East African newspaper, a vital problem for opposition parties is that "they have no money". Unable to raise funds, Uganda's opposition parties cannot recruit and retain quality leadership and a credible following. "They have limited reach: no party structures, hardly any regular contact with their supposed supporters and members, and total absence of activities geared at recruiting new members," Mr Golooba-Mutebi added.

Critics and opposition leaders accuse the NRM of gross incumbency abuse. Incumbency, however, can backfire when the party in power is confronted with a well-organised opposition, for at least two reasons.

First, precisely because of perceived and actual incumbency advantages, ruling parties suffer succession struggles as members jostle for positions when a long-reigning ruler finally bows out. This happened in Ghana in 2000 (with Jerry Rawlings) and Kenya in 2002 (with Daniel arap Moi). It could have transpired in Uganda in 2006 had Mr Museveni not bribed MPs to remove term limits, as reported in local and international media and alleged by some MPs.

Second, the electorate can be rallied to vote out the incumbent party for its poor performance. Organisational failures within the FDC and other opposition parties, however, have prevented holding the NRM to account in Uganda.

To have a fighting chance, Uganda's opposition parties need to organise and mobilise robustly to overcome constraining political and economic obstacles. They need to broaden their base by leaving their headquarters in Kampala and campaigning in the countryside. Instead of relying on external donors, the opposition needs to tap into local funding sources such as the small middle-class and business community. To beat the state's coercive machinery, the opposition should craft an appealing message and an alternative national vision.

Witness: Her Grandson Executed by Congo Police in operation Lik ofi (iron fist) – Jeanne’s Story

 

 Gen. Célestin Kanyama

One night in 2013, Jeanne was awakened by pounding on the door of her home in Kinshasa, capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo, she told Legal Link International and Human Rights Watch in a soft, sad voice. When she asked who was there, the men outside yelled “Police!” They broke down her door and rounded up all the men in the house and beat them, but let them go once they found Jeanne’s 19-year-old grandson, Joseph, whom Jeanne had helped raise. They dragged her grandson outside the house, shot him three times in the chest, and left him dead in the avenue, covered in blood.

Last November, Congo’s government began “Operation Likofi” – “iron fist” or “punch” in Lingala, one of Congo’s languages. The police operation was aimed at ending a surge of armed robberies and other crimes in Kinshasa by members of organized gangs known as “kuluna.” The kuluna carry machetes, broken bottles, and knives, and threaten or use violence to extort money, jewelry, mobile phones, and other valuables. Political leaders have also used the kuluna for protection or to intimidate opponents during elections.

Kuluna who commit crimes should be arrested and brought to justice. But Operation Likofi did not enforce the law in Kinshasa but instead reinforced a climate of fear. In raids across the city, uniformed police wearing black masks dragged suspected kuluna out of their homes at night at gunpoint with no arrest warrants. The police frequently shot and killed the unarmed youth outside their homes, often while family members and neighbors helplessly watched. Some victims were apprehended and executed in the open markets where they slept or in nearby fields or empty lots. Many others were taken to unknown locations and were not seen again. At least 51 young men and boys were killed and another 33 were forcibly disappeared during the operation.

The nightmare for victims’ families lasted well beyond the shootings.

Jeanne’s family took Joseph’s body to the morgue, but when they came to collect it for burial, morgue employees told Jeanne that the authorities had ordered them not to release the bodies of anyone killed during Operation Likofi. Jeanne yelled at the morgue employees until the police detained her. She was released later that day, but without Joseph’s body. She felt empty, she said, but she organized a traditional mourning period regardless. Yet each time the family and neighbors gathered, the police came to their home and threatened to arrest them for mourning Joseph. (Their names were changed to protect the family.)

In interviewing the families of the dead or “disappeared” teenagers and young men, the Human Rights Watch senior researcher on Congo, Ida Sawyer, heard the same pleas over and over. Those whose children were disappeared want to know what happened to them and where they are. Those whose relatives were killed want to bury them with dignity. If their children did something wrong, the families said, they should be arrested and brought to trial. You can’t just kill and kidnap people.

Police officers, intelligence agents and other officials have threatened and warned victims’ relatives, journalists, magistrates, and doctors, suggesting that senior officials knew about the killings. But rather than act to stop the police and bring those responsible to justice, authorities became more secretive and attempted to cover up the abuses. When a military magistrate wanted to investigate a police colonel who allegedly shot and killed a suspected kuluna, a government official told him to “close [his] eyes” and drop the case.

The primary commander of Operation Likofi was Gen. Célestin Kanyama, currently the Kinshasa police commissioner. Police officers who participated in the operation described a well-organized campaign during which Kanyama’s orders led to killings. One officer said he was told to call Kanyama whenever they arrested a suspect, as Kanyama would give instructions on whether to kill the youth or jail him. Kanyama himself was sometimes present during the operations. Police officers also said that many young men who weren’t immediately killed were taken to Camp Lufungula, a police camp where Kanyama was based. They said that some of those detained were taken out of the camp at night and executed.

When Sawyer met with Kanyama in August to present the Human Rights Watch research findings, he rejected all allegations of extrajudicial executions and enforced disappearances. “Operation Likofi did not have the mission to kill or to execute people,” he said. “Everything that people tell you doesn’t come from the Bible. There are rumors.”

What is urgently needed is an independent and impartial investigation into Kanyama’s role in the deaths and disappearances during the police operation he commanded.  In the meantime he should be suspended as Kinshasa’s police commissioner. The family members of the dead and missing young men and teenagers – people like Jeanne – deserve justice.

Kenya to tackle child traficking with the new Law

Legal Link International, Nairobi beaural — Kenya has passed a law that will make it easier to secure convictions for human trafficking by providing greater support to victims, encouraging them to give evidence, campaigners said.

Kenya has been on the U.S. Department of State's Tier 2 Watch List for trafficking for the past three years for failing to make serious efforts to tackle the problem. The east African nation is a source, transit and destination country for men, women and children subjected to forced labour and sex trafficking.

The country's last effort to fight trafficking, the Counter Trafficking in Persons Act, became law in 2012, but there have been very few successful prosecutions because of the high threshold of evidence required to obtain a conviction.

Last week, parliament passed the Victim Protection Bill to improve support to victims of crime, including providing a place of safety, food, medical treatment, psychosocial care and police protection where necessary. It also establishes a fund to assist victims.

"The most successful way of countering trafficking in persons, especially for children, is through securing conviction against the traffickers," said Prudence Mutiso, a lawyer with child rights charity The Cradle, which provides legal aid to children in Kenyan courts.

"With the Victim Protection Act, we will be able to have a stronger prosecution case."

MANY VICTIMS TRAUMATISED

Children in Kenya are trafficked to work as domestic labourers and in farming, fisheries and begging. They are also trafficked for sex work, particularly for tourists on the coast.
Many trafficking victims are so traumatised that they are unwilling to give evidence, Mutiso said.

"The process of interviewing the victim, collecting and corroborating evidence and investigating perpetrators is more effective when the victim is accessing care and protection from a service provider as early in the process as possible," she said.

"If the victim is traumatised and they undergo counselling with help from the funds that the government has set aside, they will be in a position to address the court more confidently."

Of more than 200 child trafficking cases brought to The Cradle since 2009, only 43 have gone to court, and there have been few convictions.

"I think it's really going to help secure some convictions; it definitely will," said Ruth Juliet Gachanja, another lawyer with The Cradle.

Campaigners believe the fact that the new law gives victims' lawyers the right to address the court will also strengthen the prosecution's case.

"... when you are a victim of crime, you can (now) have your lawyer and your lawyer can cross-examine the other party [the accused]," said Millie Mabona, a lawyer and a member of parliament who sponsored the bill.

"Your lawyer can also introduce new evidence if the prosecutor does not. This is very significant, especially for cases of trafficking, cases of sexual offences, cases of domestic violence."

Until now, lawyers representing victims had only a watching brief, which meant they sat in court as silent observers.

Prosecutions were led by police officers, often with less legal expertise than the victims' lawyers.

Africa: How the Death Penalty Is Slowly Weakening Its Grip On Africa

ANALYSIS

By Kiggundu Henry

At both global and continental levels there is an observable trend towards the abolition of the death penalty. More than two thirds of all states have now either abolished the practice or have long-standing moratoria on its use. Though Amnesty International reported a slight increase in the actual number of executions last year, the overall decline is unmistakable.

This trend of state practice can be read in conjunction with an interpretation of international human rights law as progressively abolitionist. At the time of its drafting the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) made a provision for countries which had not already abolished the death penalty, but established stringent conditions under which it could continue. Article 6 was also drafted in such a way that it envisages and indeed facilitates the abolition of the death penalty over time.

In those countries where it remains, international safeguards have both a procedural component, centred on the requirements of legality and fair trial, and also a substantive component entailing imposition only for the most serious crimes, principles of equality and consistency, and minimum standards of protection for vulnerable groups (including those with mental illness, the focus of Friday's World Day against the Death Penalty).

The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights has acknowledged "the evolution of international law and the trend towards abolition of the death penalty" and has encouraged that trend with recommendations calling for moratoria on its use. Earlier this year, one of the Commission's Working Groups convened in Cotonou, Benin, to finalise the text of an Optional Protocol to the African Charter on the abolition of the death penalty. That process was positively received by a broad array of civil society actors, and will now be finalised by the African Union.

As of October 2014, seventeen African states have abolished the death penalty by enacting national legislation. A further twenty-five State Parties have not carried out an execution for ten years. That leaves only twelve states--Botswana, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Libya, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe--which retain the death penalty and have recently used it.

Africa accounted for only 8% of the executions known to have taken place in 2013, (a figure which excludes executions in China). Of those 64 executions, 55 took place either in Somalia or Sudan.

On the international stage, ten of Africa's abolitionist states have also ratified the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR on the abolition of the death penalty, with Gabon the most recent, earlier this year.

Despite these promising trends, and the general optimism of the international community about the trajectory of the death penalty, it is important not to overlook the shadow that it still casts. Where it remains, it is a cause for concern that the death penalty can be imposed for offenses which do not meet the international legal threshold of "most serious crimes"--a term which is understood to mean only those involving intentional killing.

The case of Meriam Ibrahim, who was sentenced to death for apostasy in Sudan, brought this issue to global headlines earlier this year. The imposition of the death penalty by military tribunals--which have been found unable to meet international standards of due process for civilian matters--remains a cause of concern, particularly in Somalia.

The lack of due process within capital cases has proved a concern elsewhere on the continent. The mass-sentencing of more than 600 people in Egypt was an extreme case, but the UN has also, for example, expressed concerns that the judicial system in South Sudan is too weak to provide sufficient protection against arbitrary death sentences.

Moreover, while moratoria on executions are to be welcomed, if they are not accompanied by a change in judicial practice, long-term moratoria result in a very large number of people languishing on "death row", a condition which may amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. It is estimated that there are several thousand people on death row in Kenya, and hundreds in Algeria, Tanzania and the DRC.

But these reflections should not detract from the many positive developments which continue across much of the rest of the continent. Over the past year there has been an ongoing review of the penal code in Comoros, and the constitution in Sierra Leone. A constitutional amendment has been proposed to abolish the death penalty in Ghana.

Last month a new penal code was approved by parliamentarians in Chad that made no allowance for the death penalty, and would effectively abolish it. While other elements of this penal code give human rights activists cause for concern, the step taken towards formal abolition should be welcomed.

In May a workshop was convened in Tunisia to discuss the reform of the Penal Code, and a reduction of the number of crimes for which the death penalty might be imposed. A Parliamentary Network for Abolition is also gaining strength in Morocco. The presence of openly abolitionist Ministers of Justice in Zimababwe (Emmerson Mnangagwa) and Tanzania (Mathias Chikawe) should also be regarded in a positive light.

A number of other African states have accepted recommendations made under the UN Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review (UPR) either to work toward abolition at a national level or to make binding international commitments regarding the death penalty. If these commitments in Geneva are translated into actual policy in national capitals then the continent could soon witness a significant shift in terms of the status of the death penalty. Its grip, in this sense, is weakening.

It must be said that campaigning for the abolition of the death penalty has a certain allure for those working in human rights. The very clear cut (and usually transparent) distinction between retentionist and abolitionist states permits a Manichean view of the work. The very uplifting transition of a state from one camp to another--a progression which international law mandates should only occur in one direction--presents activists with an unusually unambiguous "win". However, it is important to bear in mind that a focus on the number of abolitionist states, designed to make the problem appear one concerning an ever-diminishing proportion of the world, can partially disguise the human cost of its continued practice.

From the perspective of the right to life, a focus on the death penalty can also be reductionist. Capital punishment is by no means the most significant threat to life in Africa, claiming fewer than 250 lives over the past seven years. In this regard, the enlargement of the mandate of the African Commission's Working Group on the Death Penalty also to include Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Killings, was a welcome development. It allows the Commission to address other violations of the right to life, such as the excessive use of force by law enforcement. In its response to mass public demonstrations in September last year, for example, Sudanese authorities are believed to have killed at least twice as many people as have been executed in that country since 2007.

The symbolic significance of the death penalty, however, should not be underestimated. Its abolition in an increasing number of countries in Africa and around the world reflects an evolving understanding of the relationship between the state and the citizen, and one which can only have a beneficial impact on the enjoyment of the right to life, as well as other human rights.

Uganda police eaten by GREED,TRIBALISM AND CORUPTION

In an opener to the level of corruption among other social economic evils in the Uganda Police Force (UPF), Just woke up as usual hearing a public out-cry on one of the local radio stations that senior police officers in Kireka a kampala suburb at kireka police station have assumed the powers of the executive, Judiciary and the legislature. as they arrest charge........................................still developing.

New Rapes and Massacre Further Expose Museveni, Kagame

  OPINION!!!!
 Ugandan and Rwanda troops are part of the African Union peacekeeping force that was recently accused of sexual violence against women in Somalia. The silence from the international community is shocking - but not surprising. One only needs to look at the activities of presidents Museveni and Kagame in DR Congo and inside their own countries to understand

Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and his Rwandan counterpart Paul Kagame had hoped that the Ebola epidemic in West Africa, the genocide committed by the Israeli army against Palestinian people, the "Boko Haram" crimes against humanity, the killing of Black people in Ferguson in the United States and the "Islamist State" in Iraq and Syria... would grab all the headlines to cover up the mass rapes recently committed in Somalia by Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian soldiers serving under the banner of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) but trained, fed and paid for by the United States of America; as well as the recent massacres in Rwanda.

For us Congolese people, when the BBC broke the news on 8 September 2014 based on a [url= Human]http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/16/amisom-s-toll-somali-women-and-girls]Human Rights Watch report[/url] that 'Africa Union troops' (that is Rwandans, Ugandans and Burundians), 'raped Muslim girls in Mogadishu', it was not a big surprise given the fact that for 13 years, Rwanda and Uganda, backed by Britain and America have invaded Congo and killed more than 8 million people and used raped as a weapon of war and looted minerals. (The Wall Street Journal reported on 18 September 2014 that of the 1,300 American companies which source their minerals from eastern Congo, only four companies were brave enough face an audit).

What was surprising was the dead silence of the United States of America, 'the leader of the world' when it comes to human rights, the United Nations and the African Union itself, for reasons that we can understand: Since 1994, the Tutsi have become untouchable despite the fact that they have committed and are committing the same crimes in Congo, in their own countries and in Somalia - yet the whole world treats them as victims. How come the victims of genocide are killing, raping and committing genocide in other countries with the complicity of the international community yet the same international community wants us to commemorate the 'Rwanda Genocide Day'? For how long is the 'international community' and the African Union going to shield Museveni and Kagame, these two Tutsi brothers, from accountability for their crimes?

It took the courage of the Christian Science Monitor, after reading the 71-page report which documented 10 cases of rape and sexual assault and 14 cases of sexual exploitation in 2013 and 2014, to challenge the conscience of the world in an article published on 8 September 2014 and titled: 'African Union forces accused of sexual abuse. Will anyone be held accountable?'
As if that was not enough, AFP reported on 9/11 that a string of arrests of prominent Rwandan military figures, some of them close to the central African nation's inner circle of power, has prompted speculation of a major political crisis. In fact, last month former presidential guard chief and serving colonel, Tom Byabagamba, and retired brigadier-general Frank Rusagara were charged in a Kigali court for inciting rebellion by 'spreading rumours'. A retired captain, David Kabuye, was also detained.

AFP quoted analysts, critics and experts who all say that the arrests expose the workings of a paranoid state that is increasingly nervous over the activities of the dissident Rwanda National Congress (RNC), an exiled opposition group that includes several former top members of the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).

'Any critic is immediately associated with the RNC, even though sometimes there is no connection,' said Rene Mugenzi, a Rwandan human rights activist exiled in Britain. He said the latest arrests targeted people seen as 'loose cannons' who were too outspoken, and that the authorities appeared worried that the RNC, which includes several former military brass, had managed to maintain their contacts in the armed forces.

But some analysts said there may be genuine concern about the threat from the dissident RNC. 'I would not rule out that those arrested are suspected of links' with the RNC, said the Belgian academic Filip Reyntjens, a fierce critic of Kagame. He said the RNC was currently the central preoccupation of the Rwandan government, especially given that a former Rwandan Chief of Staff and founding member of the RNC, General Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa, 'has kept many contacts in the military, where he was rather popular.' Another co-founder of the RNC, Rwanda's former intelligence chief Patrick Karegeya and once a comrade-in-arms of Kagame, was murdered on New Year's Eve in Johannesburg.

And the purge goes on in Kigali. In fact the President of the Rwandan Senate Jean Damascene Ntawukuliryayo was forced to resign by President Paul Kagame according to a report by L'Avenir on 19 September 2014. Reason? Ntawukuliryayo invited a delegation of Congolese parliamentarians in Kigali convinced that time has come for Rwanda and Congo to dialogue. Kagame does not see it that way! So how can we restore peace?

In addition, the Hutu FOUND NOT GUILTY by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Arusha, Tanzania, Hutu exonerated by the ICTR in Arusha, still remain unwanted and undesirable in Rwanda or elsewhere in the world! For Kagame, whether found not guilty or not, they are still 'genocidists'! When international justice does not lean on the side of Kagame, he vilifies it. But is Rwanda not currently a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council? Has Rwanda not been joined by Sam Kutesa from Uganda as the current president of the 69th session of the United Nations General Assembly? So why should they not respect the verdict of the a UN tribunal?

In fact, a Reuters report on 28 September 2014 highlighted the plight of Justin Mugenzi and others who might also be acquitted soon, who live in limbo in safe houses in Arusha because they are too scared to go back to Rwanda, where political rivals now hold sway. According to Reuters, the plight of Mugenzi and others like him is a setback to years-long efforts to create a system of international justice by using special courts such as the ICTR - set up to try those accused of carrying out the Rwandan genocide - or permanent tribunals with a more general remit such as the Hague-based International Criminal Court.

Worst of all, the culture of machete, massacres and genocide is still rife in Rwanda and Burundi. Proof? Up to 40 dead bodies, including some wrapped in plastic, were discovered by Burundian fisherman in Lake Rweru in July and August. The identity of the bodies and the circumstances surrounding their deaths remain unclear. Reuters quoted Burundian authorities on 25 September 2014 as saying that 'there are no indications the bodies are of Burundian citizens. They say they have asked families living in the area but have not had reports of any missing individuals.' The head of the criminal investigation division of the Rwandan police, Theos Badege, repeated previous statements that the bodies were not Rwandan nationals. As the two tiny countries traded accusations, the Burundian ambassador to Belgium spilled the beans and revealed that the 40 bodies were floating from Akagera River from Rwanda into Lake Rweru which separates Rwanda and Burundi, suggesting that a slaughter had taken place in Rwanda. President Kagame requested an explanation from the Burundian government (led by a Hutu) but the explanation was not forthcoming. So he decided to expel the ambassador Burundian, according to a report by L'Avenir 16 September 2014.

America's double standard again came to light when the US called on Rwanda and Burundi to investigate the discovery of up to 40 dead bodies. 'We firmly believe that these victims deserve to be identified. Their families deserve to know their fate, and those responsible should be brought to justice,' Jen Psaki, a spokeswoman for the State Department, said in a statement. The United States called on the two countries to conduct a 'prompt, thorough, and impartial and concerted investigation' into the deaths with the assistance of 'independent, international forensic experts,' she said.

For more than 16 years, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and the so-called rebels they have masterminded in Congo have killed more 8 million Congolese people. The United States has never called on them to be brought to justice because Rwanda and Uganda act as mercenaries for the U.S. in Africa, especially in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. In fact in 2005, Uganda was found guilty by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of violating the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Congo, plundering its natural resources and was responsible for human rights abuses when it sent its troops there. And the Museveni state has not paid the $10 billion Congo demanded as part of the court ruling. Rwanda's turn will come.

For Museveni and Kagame using the 1994 genocide as a tramp card does not bite anymore. Even recently at the 69th UN General Assembly, Museveni, not long ago nicknamed as the 'Bismarck of the Great Lakes Region of Africa', devoted a big chunk of his speech on the history of the ancient Kongo Kingdom, arguing that 'the Kingdom of Kongo covered parts of Northern Angola, Cabinda, parts of the Republic of Congo and Western parts of the DRC. As a consequence of the actions of colonialism, that polity declined and disintegrated. It is only now that the modern countries of that area are regenerating that portion of Africa'.

The truth of the matter is that Museveni and Kagame have failed in the macabre and sinister mission Anglo-Saxon powers assigned to them in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, especially that of balkanizing the Democratic Republic of Congo. Just recently, the Congolese army and its SADC allied defeated Rwandan and Ugandan troops in eastern Congo masquerading as M23 rebels and drove them out of there.

Antoine Roger Lokongo is a Congolese journalist studying for a PhD in Biejing, China.

THE VIEWS OF THE ABOVE ARTICLE ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHOR/S AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REFLECT THE VIEWS OF THE legal link international EDITORIAL TEAM

Uhuru Kenyatta Trial not working well-Morreno Ocampo

 
Former chief prosecutor for the ICC, Luis Moreno Ocampo has conceded that the trial against Uhuru Kenyatta "was not working well".

Ocampo who handled the case in its initial stages upto to trial, however welcomed Kenyatta's scheduled appearance as "showing African commitment to change", according to a BBC report.

The former prosecutor's damning statement comes hours before Kenyatta faces the judges to discuss accusation by prosecution that Kenya was not cooperating with the court.

Former Special Court for Sierra Leone prosecutor David Crane added his voice to the debate, "If you're going to indict a head of state you can't make mistakes".

The status conference starts at 10:30am Kenyan time. Kenyatta who is in the Hague in his personal capacity will be treated like any other suspect within the court premises.

Prosecutors accused the Kenyan government on Tuesday of failing to hand over phone and bank records they said would help them show Kenyatta paid collaborators to take part in post-election violence in 2007.

Attorney General Githu Muigai said Kenya had cooperated to the extent permitted by domestic law and provided all information available.

Muigai said there were limits to what Kenyan authorities could do to obtain Kenyatta's records.

"Where it has been possible within the law to carry out an independent interrogation of the requested subject, we have done so," he said. He had transmitted three months of Kenyatta's banking records, he said.

The case was to start in September but the prosecution asked the court to postpone the case indefinitely. The prosecution says the evidence available is yet to meet the "beyond reasonable doubt".

Most of prosecution witnesses against Kenyatta have withdrawn from the case.

Kenyatta has denied the charges levelled against him.

Kenyatta is allegedly criminally responsible as an indirect co-perpetrator pursuant to article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute for the crimes against humanity of: murder (article 7(l)(a)); deportation or forcible transfer (article 7(l)(d)); rape (article 7(l)(g)); persecution (articles 7(l)(h)); and other inhumane acts (article 7(l)(k)).
The case is at 'critical juncture' because the Chamber will decide on two things: indefinite adjournment of the trial( prosecution request) and or terminate( defence demand).

Justice Minister resigns-President accepts

 Former Justice Minister Christiana Tah

In a major blow to the Unity Party-led government of President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, Justice Minister Christiana Tah has tendered in her resignation. The former Justice Minister is said to have cited a litany of reasons ranging from the undermining of her office, which prevented her from investigating allegations of fraud against the National Security Agency to a wide range of issues bordering interference from the Executive Branch.

"I cannot be the minister of Justice and not supervise the operations of the security agencies under the Minister of Justice to independently investigate allegations of fraud against the National Security Agency.

What is the rule of law if a duly appointed Minister of Justice with oversight has grave concerns about what her violational resignation will mean for her own personal security and freedom as a Liberian citizen," an excerpt of the letter of resignation by the Justice Minister.

Minister Tah's resignation letter was reportedly tendered to the government after serving the Ellen Johnson-led government for six years. Cllr. Tah told a news conference in Monrovia Monday that she had respectfully asked the President to accept her resignation.

"These are perilous times of our nation and I take solace in our resilience as a people as I pray that we learn and emerge from the challenges of our nation building stronger," she said.

She thanked President Sirleaf for the opportunity to serve her country in the capacity of the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice for six years, adding: "I thanked the Liberian people for your support, cooperation and understanding in even the most difficult times."

Cllr. Tah succeeded former Justice Minister Francis Johnson Allison, who served as the first Justice Minister in President Sirleaf's government. An Executive Mansion release issued late evening yesterday said President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf has received and accepted the resignation of the Minister of Justice and Attorney-General, Republic of Liberia, Cllr. Christiana Tah.

According to an Executive Mansion release, Cllr. Tah tendered in her resignation as Minister of Justice and Attorney-General, Republic of Liberia on Monday, October 6, 2014 at a meeting with the Liberian President at her Foreign Ministry office earlier yesterday. Early this year, the Supreme Court barred Justice Minister from practicing law for six months after being found guilty of contempt.

The ruling cited Tah's decision to grant "compassionate release" to journalist Rodney Sieh, who was jailed last year in connection with a libel case, as the reason for its ruling and her suspension. In 2010, Sieh's Front PageAfrica newspaper printed allegations that Agriculture Minister Chris Toe's ministry could not account for millions of dollars, leading Toe to file a libel claim against the journalist.

Rodney Sieh was jailed in August after failing to produce the US$1.5 million that Toe was awarded by the court. The justice minister allowed the journalist to be released for 30 days in October after he was hospitalized with malaria, which critics say was not compatible with Liberian law.

Toe withdrew his claim in November. The Supreme Court called Sieh's release a disregard of the court's order despite the fact that his right to seek medical treatment while in prison was not surrendered. There have been many recent controversies involving imprisonment of and danger to journalists throughout the world.

Law Society Takes On Top Judges

The Law Society of Swaziland is taking on the kingdom's judiciary, arguing that King Mswati III has appointed judges in violation of the constitution.

An attempt to challenge the appointment as a High Court Judge of Mpendulo Simelane failed on Friday (1 August 2014) when a case at the High Court was dismissed before the Law Society's lawyers arrived at the court.

The Law Society argues that Simelane is too inexperienced to be a High Court Judge. It says the constitution states that a High Court Judge must have at least 10 years' experience in legal practice. The Law Society says Simelane only has five years' experience, which the judge disputes.

In Swaziland, King Mswati rules as an absolute monarch and he chooses the judges. Critics say that Swazi judges tend to do the bidding of the King, rather than uphold the constitution.

The King reappointed Michael Ramodibedi as Chief Justice in contravention of the constitution that states the holder of this position should be a Swazi. Ramodibedi comes from Lesotho.

The three judges on the High Court bench in the Simelane case were themselves inexperienced. The chair, Judge Abande Dlamini, sits in the Industrial Court and had been sworn in as an acting High Court Judge only the day before.

The other two judges on the bench, Justices Mbuso Simelane and Bongani Dlamini are also only acting judges.

Together they dismissed the Law Society's case and awarded punitive damages against the organisation when at 9.30am the case was called three times and the Law Society failed to answer. The Law Society's legal team arrived at the court 15 minutes later.

The Law Society is to appeal the decision. Meanwhile, it is also to challenge the appointment of Judge Abande Dlamini, because, as with Simelane, Dlamini has not been a legal practitioner for at least 10 years.

It also says that Justices Mbuso Simelane and Bongani Dlamini should not hear a case brought by the Law Society because they are themselves members of that organisation.

Judge Mpendulo Simelane was criticised by the United States, the European Union and many human right organisations across the world last month when he sentenced a magazine editor Bheki Makhubu and human rights lawyer Thulani Maseko to two years imprisonment after they wrote and published articles critical of the judiciary in general and Chief Justice Michael Ramodibedi in particular.

Following the dismissal of the Law Society's application, the Swazi Observer, a newspaper in effect owned by King Mswati III, reported that permanent High Court judges were available to hear the case and it was not necessary to have acting judges on the bench.

It speculated that Chief Justice Ramodibedi did not trust some of the permanent High Court judges.

The newspaper reported that in May 2014 Ramodibedi issued warrants for the arrest of three High Court judges, but had to withdraw them after Supreme Court judges threatened to resign if the arrests went ahead.

The newspaper reported, 'The move to sideline the judges is consistent too with the CJ's recent interview in one of the tabloid weekly publications that some judges were being used to overthrow the Monarch and he would not allow them whilst he was still in charge.

'This recent move by the CJ is a vote of no confidence to the rest of the judges of the High Court to listen to such an application,' the newspaper reported.

courtsy of SLS

International Criminal Court Opens Second Probe Into Central African Republic Violence

 The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court announced that she is opening a second investigation into the situation in the Central African Republic (CAR) with respect to crimes allegedly committed since 2012.

Fatou Bensouda recalled in a statement issued to the press that in February of this year, following an escalation of violence in CAR, she opened a new preliminary examination to assess whether or not to proceed with an investigation into what was a "dire" situation in the country.

Thousands of people are estimated to have been killed in CAR in a conflict which erupted when mainly Muslim Séléka rebels launched attacks in December 2012 and then took on increasingly sectarian overtones as mainly Christian militias known as anti-Balaka (anti-machete) took up arms.

"My Office has gathered and scrupulously analysed relevant information from multiple reliable sources. Based on this independent and comprehensive analysis, I have concluded that an investigation is warranted," said Ms. Bensouda.

"The information available provides a reasonable basis to believe that both the Séléka and the anti-Balaka groups have committed crimes against humanity and war crimes including murder, rape, forced displacement, persecution, pillaging, attacks against humanitarian missions and the use of children under 15 in combat.

"The list of atrocities is endless. I cannot ignore these alleged crimes."

CAR - specifically the events relating to the events of 2002-2003 - was already one of eight situations already under investigation by the Court, along with the Darfur region of Sudan, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Libya, Mali and northern Uganda.

The transitional government of CAR decided to refer the situation to the Prosecutor's Office on 30 May 2014, requesting the investigation into alleged crimes falling within the ICC's jurisdiction committed in the country since 1 August 2012.

"The 30 May 2014 referral by the CAR authorities demonstrates a commitment to fight impunity for mass crimes and to bring justice to the victims. We look forward to their full cooperation as we conduct our investigation into these crimes," said Ms. Bensouda.

"As the investigation moves forward, we will continue to record any new crime against civilians that might be committed in CAR," she added.

"Mass crimes shock the conscience of humanity and tear at the social fabric of society. Let this be a message to would-be perpetrators in CAR and beyond: such crimes will not be tolerated and will be met with the full force of the law."

Civil Society Condemns Immunity for Sitting African Leaders Accused of Serious Crimes

 African Union Commission Chairperson Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma

Legal Link International,Nairobi beaural — Mary Wacu lived in the Rift Valley region for 10 years prior to the 2007/08 post-election violence that rocked Kenya after a disputed general election.

"My husband was shot with a poisoned arrow, and my children hacked to death. Everything was burnt to ashes, I barely escaped with my life," she tells IPS.

According to human rights organisations, the violence in this East African nation left an estimated 1,500 people dead and resulted in the rape of 3,000 women and the displacement of 300,000 people.

From her shanty in the sprawling Kibera slums, in Nairobi, Kenya's capital, Wacu follows the proceedings of the cases for crimes against humanity levelled against President Uhuru Kenyatta, his deputy William Ruto and journalist Joshua Sang at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Netherlands.

But here in Kenya, like many who bore the brunt of the unprecedented violence, justice remains beyond Wacu's reach. It is a scenario that is all too familiar in Africa's conflict-prone countries like Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Against this backdrop, civil society organisations (CSOs) in Africa as well as international ones working on the continent, have opposed the recently-adopted Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights by the African Union (AU) member heads of states in June.

The protocol extends criminal jurisdiction to the African Court, and offers immunity to serving heads of states and all senior government officials during their term of office for serious crimes. The African Court was established by African countries to ensure protection of human and peoples' rights on the continent.

A source from Malawi attending the just-concluded meeting to promote ratification of AU treaties, which was held in Nairobi by the AU Office of the Legal Counsel on the 25 and 26 of August, explains to IPS that the amendments include an immunity provision for heads of states or governments and certain senior state officials for serious crimes against humanity.

The contentious article 46A categorically states that no charges shall be commenced or continued against any serving AU head of state or government, or anybody acting or entitled to act in such capacity.

"Lifting immunity for sitting officials for serious crimes committed is an assurance to African leaders that they are above the law," the source says.

AU officials at the meeting, however, refused to comment to IPS on the protocol.
Malawi has taken the lead in mobilising other CSOs across Africa to tell their governments that the immunity provision is a blatant disrespect for human rights.

The source says that with a number of African leaders already under the radar of the ICC, "an immunity provision is offering African leaders the licence to abuse their people. It will further entrench dictatorship since many leaders will be afraid of being indicted when their term ends."

The civil society community says that the African Court was moving in the right direction, until now.

Edigah Kavulavu, of the Kenyan Section of the International Commission of Jurists, tells IPS that the adopted protocol is the first legal instrument to extend a regional court's authority to criminal jurisdiction "regional courts often deal with human rights issues, which are matters of a civil nature."

He says that the African Court can now try cases of a criminal nature, including genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

He points out that the main bone of contention with the protocol is the immunity provision. Article 46A, Kavulavu says, is in breach of the principles that govern human rights.

"Through ICC and other regional courts such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone, these courts complement each other so that they can bridge the impunity gap," he explains.

James Gondi of the Kenyans For Peace With Truth and Justice, a coalition of over 30 Kenyan and East African legal, human rights, and governance organisations, tells IPS that international criminal law and international justice demand that "those bearing greatest responsibility are often head of states, heads of military and high level elites who plan, finance and coordinate criminal acts [be held to account]. The amendment is meant to serve the interests of these three categories of people."

The human rights lawyer further says that immunity negates the principles of transparency and accountability, respect for the rule of law and for humanity.

He says that the immunity provision is a display that African leaders are immune to the criminal justice system.

Gondi says that the objective of the criminal justice of which the African Court now has mandate is and should be to "deter future atrocities and to end impunity."

The lawyer says that the regime of law has developed such that immunity for heads of state is lifted in many national and international laws where crimes committed are so heinous that the law cannot turn a blind eye.

African countries with national laws that rule out immunity for sitting officials for serious crimes include Benin, Kenya, Burkina Faso the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Africa.

Gondi says that while the general principle of the law is that "we cannot give immunity for crimes against humanity because they are so grave. The law is an issue of politics and politics are defined by impunity and political will."

Moving forward, Gondi says that there must be a concerted international and regional effort to end impunity and the political will to drive these efforts, "citizens must also demand for accountability from their leaders."

The Malawi source urged CSOs to lobby, protest and campaign to have their governments reject the adoption and continue with sustained campaigns.

Homeless Children Face Violence, Exploitation in UGANDA

 

Legal Link Iternational Beural-Nairobi. Uganda is failing to protect homeless children against police abuse and other violence, Human Rights Watch said in a report released on 17th July 2014. Street children throughout Uganda’s urban centers face violence, and physical and sexual abuse. National and local government officials should put an end to organized roundups of street children, hold police and others accountable for beatings, and provide improved access for these children to education and healthcare.

The 71-page report,"Where Do You Want Us to Go?" Abuses against street Children in Uganda documents human rights violations against street children by police and local government officials, as well as abuses by members of the community and older homeless children and adults. Police and other officials, including those from the Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA), have beaten, extorted money from, and arbitrarily detained street children after targeted roundups. In police cells children have faced further beatings and forced labor, including cleaning the cells and police living quarters. On the streets, homeless adults and older children harass, threaten, beat, sexually abuse, force drugs upon, and exploit street children, often with impunity.

“Ugandan authorities should be protecting and helping homeless children, not beating them up or throwing them in police jails with adults,” said Maria Burnett, senior Africa researcher. “The government should end arbitrary roundups of street children and protect them from abuse.”

Over half of all Ugandans are under 15, and children are the single largest demographic group living in poverty. According to independent groups, local government officials, and police officers from the Child and Family Protection Unit (CFPU), the number of Ugandan children living on the streets is increasing, though the total number is not known.

Human Rights Watch interviewed over 130 current and former street children from December 2013 to February 2014 in seven town centers throughout Uganda. Human Rights Watch also interviewed 49 members of organizations providing assistance to street children, health care workers, international humanitarian and children’s organizations, police, and local government officials.

Human Rights Watch documented how police and officials threaten street children at night, and beat them with batons, whips, or wires to extort bribes or as a punishment for vagrancy. Some children hand over whatever small sums they have to avoid further abuse or detention. Scores of street children told Human Rights Watch that they fear the authorities and that police are a source of violence, not protection.

Children have sometimes been detained in police stations with adults and mistreated by cellmates. Many were released back to the streets after several days, or in some cases weeks, often only after paying a bribe or being forced to do work for the police. Other children have been transferred to one of the country’s national remand homes for juveniles accused or convicted of crimes or to the Kampiringisa National Rehabilitation Center, a juvenile detention center, even though they did not face any charges. Kampiringisa, outside Kampala, has been criticized by local nongovernmental organizations and parliament for inadequate staffing and deplorable detention conditions.

A 16-year-old boy from Jinja district who has lived on the streets of various towns for seven years told Human Rights Watch, “These police have to give us our rights. They should make us a home where we can be taken, but let it not be a police station, let it not have policemen so that it is not a prison. This is our country too. Let us not be strangers in our own country.”

Homeless children also are at risk of beatings and forced drug use from older homeless children or adults. Both boys and girls living on the street reported being raped or sexually assaulted by men and older street boys. In some instances, community members also harass, threaten, beat, and exploit street children. When a suspected or actual theft occurs, communities have converged on street children, occasionally carrying out mob violence.

Organizations working with street children told Human Rights Watch that police do little to investigate crimes against street children. Street children told Human Rights Watch that they rarely reported crimes by their peers or adults to the police for fear of reprisals, or that the police would beat or arrest them instead.

Because street children are often the first suspects for a crime, such as theft, police frequently arrest the children and detain them, often without charge. The Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development and local government officials periodically order general roundups of street children throughout the country. These roundups usually occur ahead of special events, official visits, or international conferences, or are a way for the ministry to be seen to be doing something about the perceived “problem” of street children. The head of the CFPU, a police unit tasked to address child abuse and neglect, told Human Rights Watch that, in Kampala, police are asked to provide security during roundup operations.

To find food to survive, children reported working as vendors, porters, domestic help, or laborers in homes, small restaurants, and other businesses. They were paid little for long hours of physically demanding and difficult work. Some children were victims of commercial sexual exploitation, reliant on sex work to survive.

“Instead of being able to turn to the police or local government officials for help when they’ve been abused, children find themselves living in fear of the authorities meant to protect them,” Burnett said.

The Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development is charged with protecting children and has created multiple programs and policies intended to protect the rights of vulnerable children. Uganda has also signed a number of regional and international child protection conventions and has put in place a legal framework designed to protect children’s rights, including those of street children. However, key state child protection agencies are failing to respond adequately or effectively to the needs of these children or to stop the abuses at the hands of the police and local authorities.

One staff member from an organization that helps street children told Human Rights Watch: “Government structures should not just be there in name. They should function. In Kampala, apart from beating them up, the government is doing nothing [for street children]. If all systems were working, you would not see these children suffering.”

The government of Uganda should end roundups and abuses against street children and investigate violence directed at homeless children. Rather than vilifying street children, the government should investigate and prosecute those responsible for abuse, including police and officials. The Uganda Police Force leadership should increase the number of officers working in the Child and Family Protection Unit to ensure there is ample staffing and resources to improve protection of vulnerable and homeless children in all districts. The government should ensure that street children have the same rights and protections under domestic, regional, and international standards as all other Ugandan children.

International partners should actively denounce roundups and police abuse of street children and coordinate with government and nongovernmental groups to carry out child protection systems. Donors should consider supporting organizations and activities throughout the country that help street children.

 “For children to be effectively protected and cared for, the government should ensure that all children, including those on the streets, can find shelter and get an education,” Burnett said. “They should be treated with dignity and have the opportunity to find a safe way off the streets.”

Selected quotes from the report:

“There is a tradition – kwercho – that the police use as a way of punishment in threes: the first beating is to open your eyes; the second is to show you the way home; the third is to send you home. They say this to you [as they beat you]…. They kept us in rooms where we were caned … from the back to the buttocks. On the third day they opened the gate and we were caned as we left.”
—15-year-old boy living 10 years on the streets of Lira, December 2013

“Government should look for a better solution for street children instead of beating and arresting us. The more you beat us the more we get hardened with life and it does not solve the problem. They want us to go back home but some of us do not even have homes. Others do not know where our parents are. So when they beat us to go home, where do you want us to go?”
—15-year-old boy who lived four years on the streets in Masaka, December 2013

“[The policemen] take money from us. If you do not have money they beat you so much…. Last week on Saturday, police came in the night and beat me when I was sleeping with three other children. The policeman beat me on the thighs with a rubber whip. He then hit my knees with a baton. He beat me until I gave him 1,000 shillings (US$0.40) and left me.”
—13-year-old boy living two years on the streets in Lira, December 2013

“We don’t report these things to police. I don’t think that they would listen to us. They will ask us ‘Are you not an adult? If they raped you so what?’”
—14-year-old girl, Masaka, December 2013

Contributed by Human Rights Watch.

POWER AND PROFILING TORTURING KENYA'S SOMALIS

Analysis

The ongoing Kenyan government security sweep against Somalis has generated reactions both serious and comical. In May, the visiting Chinese Prime Minister, Le Keqiang, vowed to help Kenya in its efforts to repatriate illegal Somalis back to their country.

Beijing's offer was an attempt to curry favor with the Kenyan government, with which it then signed a trade agreement worth several billion dollars. The premier reiterated what his hosts wanted to hear: illegal Somalis and those suspected of having ties with Al-Shabaab must be deported from Kenya.

Even more absurd was the statement by Somalia's State Minister for Foreign Affairs, Buri Hamza, in its dangling of the khat card (a mild stimulant plant known in Kenya as miraa).

In an interview with one of Kenya's papers on June 1st, Hamza alluded to the possibility of a trade war between Mogadishu and Nairobi. "If we stop importing miraa," the minister stated, "so much the better." Many in Somalia are addicted to khat, and it would be a herculean task - not to mention political suicide for the Mogadishu regime - to ban its importation from Kenya.

On a more serious note, the security sweep exposed fissures in Kenyan society and added controversy to the ongoing debate about the role and position of Kenyan Somalis in the country.

The Somali factor in Kenyan politics is paradoxical. On the one hand, Somali Kenyans have been gaining increasing power in politics and business, but they have also become victims of periodic profiling and mistrust.

In the 1960s, Kenya's first president, Jomo Kenyatta, became increasingly frustrated with the persistence of the Shifta fighters in the predominantly Somali-inhabited region of the Northern Frontier District - now the North Eastern Province - who were agitating to secede from Kenya and join their brethren in Somalia.

Kenyatta saw no difference between the Shifta and ordinary Kenyan Somalis - he was known to repeat the aphorism: "mtoto wa nyoka ni nyoka" (a child of a snake is still a snake). Kenyatta came up with his own solution to the problem when he told them plainly: "Pack up and go, but leave us the land." The Somalis understandably shunned this directive and stayed.

Five decades later, Kenyatta's son, President Uhuru Kenyatta, has cast a dragnet aimed at Somalis which directly and indirectly affects not only the country's large contingency of refugees and immigrants but also Kenyan Somalis.

Kenyan Somalis inhabit a vast north eastern territory which is one of the poorest and least-developed regions in Kenya and are also concentrated in the Eastleigh district of Nairobi.

The Somali Kenyan population has grown from several hundred thousand in the 1960s to approximately 2.3 million now, but still represents a minority among the country's 43 million people.

In 1989, two years before the onslaught of Somali refugees in Kenya, the Kenyan government singled out Somali Kenyans to carry a pink ID card in addition to the identity document issued to all Kenyan citizens.

This pink card, which highlighted the government's discriminatory stance toward Somalis, was declared unconstitutional in 2003, but, even so, Somalis still remain the target of harassment and extortion. In Eastleigh, police officers, whether assigned there or not, routinely make money by stopping and harassing Somalis, legal or illegal. Somalis in Nairobi call themselves "Human ATMs."

The label gained credibility when a large number of Somalis, briefly detained in the security sweep, secured their release by bribing police officers. Oddly, some elected Somali officials in the Kenyan parliament were themselves stopped and briefly detained, even though they had shown the police their Kenyan and parliamentary IDs.

Ali Abdi Bule, a Tana River senator, was stopped and detained for half an hour because police officers said his papers were false. The police then released him. In another incident, Senator Billow Kerrow's house was searched in clear contravention of his parliamentary immunity.

On the flip-side, Somali Kenyans are experiencing a golden age in terms of their high representation in the corridors of political power. They have solid representation in Uhuru's Jubilee Coalition Government, with three cabinet portfolios - foreign affairs, industrialization, sports/culture and arts--which are headed by Somalis.

A Somali is serving as the chairman of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) and two are sitting judges in the country's highest courts: One in the Supreme Court and the other in the Appeals Court. President Uhuru's legal advisor is also Somali.

In the past, ethnic Somalis have held important positions, including Minister of Defense, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, National Chief of Police and Head of the Election Commission.

The number of Somali parliamentarians on the legislative branch has increased from 13 a year ago to 32 today. Aden Bare Duale, a politician known for his bombastic rhetoric, holds the post of the National Assembly majority leader. He told a Somali audience in Eastleigh in April that elected Somali officials were, for all practical purposes, in control of the government. "We know how to unlock this government," he boasted.

In business, Eastleigh has become a residential haven and a booming business hub for Somalis. The district is the umbilical cord and the economic center of the Somali community and Duale asserts that Somalis manage most of the real estate developments in the country and 80 percent of the fuel trade; they own 80% of all of Kenya's imported goods, and one of every five cars. Many Somalis from the diaspora have also invested heavily in Kenya, particularly in real estate.

Is the increasing prominence of Somalis in politics and business the reason law enforcement is profiling and targeting them? Somali politicians and opposition figures have argued that the security campaign is an attempt to disenfranchise Somalis as a group.

The Secretary General of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) opposition party, Peter Anyang' Nyong'o, suggested that the security crackdown was a case of ethnic profiling with the goal of wining back the trust of the West and flushing successful Somali businesses out of the country.
Somali Senator Billow Kerrow also questioned the real motive behind the government's campaign. Somalis, stated Kerrow, are known globally for their business acumen, and the current security dragnet is "an economic war and not a fight against terror."

After almost three months of the campaign, the government has yet to arrest any suspected terrorist or dismantle a cell. In addition, Uhuru's government has been dragging its feet to appoint an independent commission to investigate the Westgate Mall terrorist bombing.

While human rights organizations have condemned the campaign, the dragnet has also shown the political divide among Somali leaders in Kenya and their ambivalent approach to security issues bedeviling the country. While all these leaders condemn terrorists, some have issued statements that further aggravated the situation and made some Kenyans question how committed Somali leaders are in the fight against terrorism.

In a televised speech, Duale told an audience in Eastleigh that those responsible for the bombings in that district should bomb elsewhere. Then, he oddly mentioned Machakos, a town and major urban center 64 kilometers southeast of Nairobi, as an alternative target. "Had the bombers targeted Machakos," Duale added, "Eastleigh would not have been harassed." Duale later denied making the statement.

The former deputy speaker of the Kenyan Parliament, Farah Moalim, has alleged in the media that the government, not Al-Shabaab, is behind the bombings in Kenya. Moalim subscribes to the conspiracy theory that the United States Government actually finances Al-Shabaab.

But not all Somali politicians in Kenya have spoken against the security sweep. For instance, the Somali cabinet ministers in the government and the former Minister of Defense, Senator Yusuf Haji, have yet to issue a statement about the crackdown.

Somali Kenyans exist in a precarious position. As a group they are prominently represented in politics and business, but they have also become a football, frequently kicked by the country's president, his deputy, and the security establishment. Some Kenyans still view Somalis as aliens who are business rivals and a security liability.

The dragnet is creating a climate of fear in the Somali community but we do not know yet whether this is a long-term trend or a consequence of the enduring success of Al Shabaab in Somalia and increasingly Kenya.

Uganda: Deeply Flawed HIV Bill Approved

(Kampala) – The HIV Prevention and Control Act passed by the Ugandan parliament on May 13, 2014, is discriminatory and will impede the fight against AIDS,Legal Link International, Human Rights Watch, HEALTH Global Action Project, and Uganda Network on Law, Ethics and HIV/AIDS said today.

The bill includes mandatory HIV testing for pregnant women and their partners, and allows medical providers to disclose a patient’s HIV status to others. The bill also criminalizes HIV transmission, attempted transmission, and behavior that might result in transmission by those who know their HIV status.

“This HIV bill is yet another step backward in the fight against AIDS in Uganda,” said Maria Burnett, senior Africa researcher at Human Rights Watch. “It is founded on stigma and discrimination and based on approaches that have been condemned by international health agencies as ineffective and violating the rights of people living with HIV.”

Mandatory HIV testing and the disclosure of medical information without consent are contrary to international best practices and violate fundamental human rights, the three groups said. The criminalization of HIV transmission, attempted transmission, and behavior that might result in transmission by those who know their HIV status is overly broad, and difficult to enforce.

UNAIDS and other international agencies have discouraged such laws, which can disproportionately target women, who because of health care during pregnancy may be more likely to know their HIV status.

The bill has been pending inUganda's parliament since 2010. It passed even though the Health Ministry’s AIDS Control Program, the Uganda AIDS Commission, and many independent health rights groups in Uganda do not support the contentious clauses and urged Uganda to fight HIV with more effective legislation.

“For Uganda to address its HIV epidemic effectively, it needs to partner with people living with HIV, not blame them, criminalize them, and exclude them from policy making,” said Dorah Kiconco, executive director of Uganda Network on Law, Ethics & HIV/AIDS. “The president should not sign this bill and instead ensure a rights-based approach, recognizing that people living with HIV will prevent transmission if they are empowered and supported.”

According to the Uganda’s Health Ministry 2012 AIDS Indicator Survey, an estimated 1.5 million Ugandans were living with HIV. There are at least 140,000 new infections annually, including 28,000 from maternal to child transmission. Uganda’s HIV policies over the last decade have emphasized abstinence-only approaches for youth and marital fidelity. Combined with punitive laws against sex workers and homosexuals, these approaches are felt by many to have increased the stigma and discrimination around HIV and discouraged more people from being tested and treated.

“At the upcoming international AIDS conference, Uganda will be the example to all the countries gathered of how not to write laws on the HIV response,” said Asia Russell, international policy director at Health GAP (Global Access Project). “Parliamentarians are doing precisely the opposite of what Uganda should be doing to fight HIV.”

KENYA:STOP ARRESTS AND ILEGAL DENTENTION OF SOMALIES

Kenyan police and other security agencies should stop arbitrary arrests and detentions, extortion, and other abuses against Somalis during security operations,  Human Rights Watch and Legal Link International said today. The government should also halt summary deportations and ensure that any undocumented Somalis are given the opportunity to file asylum claims.

On April 4 and 8, 2014, Human Rights Watch and Legal Link International visited Pangani police station in Eastleigh and found hundreds of detainees packed into cells designed to accommodate 20 people. Detainees had no room to sit, and the cells were filthy with urine and excrement. Police were also holding detainees beyond the 24-hour limit proscribed under Kenyan law, without taking them to court. One man at Pangani station complained to Legal Link International that he had been held for eight days without being taken to court.

“Scapegoating and abusing Somalis for heinous attacks by unknown people is not going to protect Kenyans, Somalis, or anyone else against more attacks,” said Gerry Simpsom, senior refugee researcher at Human Rights Watch. "Kenay’s deportation of Somalis to their conflict-ridden country without allowing them to seek asylum would be a flagrant breach of its legal obligations.”

Since April 2, almost 4,000 people are reported to have been arrested and detained in Nairobi and Mombasa. According to Human Rights Watch research, some of the detainees have been released after they produced identification documents, but only after days in deplorable detention conditions or after they paid bribes. On April 9, the Kenyan authorities summarily deported 82 undocumented Somali nationals from the capital, Nairobi, to Somalia. Kenyan officials have said that they plan to deport all undocumented Somali nationals as part of the response to recent grenade and other attacks in Kenya by unidentified people.

The Kenyan government began a massive security operation in Nairobi’s predominantly Somali Eastleigh district on April 2. On April 9, Interior Cabinet Secretary Joseph Ole Lenku told the mediathat, during “Operation Usalama Watch,” police had arrested “almost 4,000 people.” An Administration Police spokesman, Masoud Mwinyi,said police had arrested and screened 3,000 people of whom 467 had been detained for further investigation. He said police had also charged 67 people with various unspecified offenses.

According to Kenyan officials, the operation began in response to a number of attacks in Nairobi and Mombasa in March that killed a total of 12 people and injured 8 more. An attack on a Nairobi shopping mall in September 2013 killed 67 people and injured hundreds.

Kenyan police operations in Nairobi and Mombasa in the wake of attacks have resulted on numerous occasions in serious human rights violations against both refugees and Kenyan citizens, Human Rights Watch said.

In the Pangani police station, Human Rights Watch witnessed police whipping, beating, and verbally abusing detainees. There have been numerous credible accounts of Kenyan security forces extorting money and beating people during the arrests and in detention. 

Hundreds, and possibly thousands, of people have also been detained in the Kasarani sports stadium in Nairobi. Independent investigators and media were denied access to Kasarani until April 9, when a limited visit was permitted. People who participated said that they were only provided limited access and were not able to freely interview detainees in the stadium.

On April 8,Lenku said, “The process will continue until we do not have illegal aliens and those found to have refugees documents are taken to refugees camps.”

Kenyan security forces, including the Administration Police and General Service Unit (GSU) have a  record of committing serious human rights violations during security operations against communities of ethnic Somalis, Human Rights Watch said.

A May 2013 Human Rights Watch report described how Kenyan police in Nairobi tortured, raped, and otherwise abused and arbitrarily detained at least 1,000 refugees, including women and children, between mid-November 2012 and late January 2013, following grenade and other attacks in Eastleigh. The police called the refugees “terrorists” and said they should move to the refugee camps.

“For the second time in less than two years, the world is looking on aghast as Kenyan security forces abuse countless men, women, and children alike in the heart of Kenya, just a stone’s throw from government ministries and the United Nations,”  Simpson said.

The police sweeps follow announcement on March 26th that all urban refugees were required to move to refugee camps. Such a move would violate a July 26, 2013 Kenya High Court ruling, which quashed an identical government refugee relocation plan from December 2012.

According to credible sources, some Somali refugees arrested in Eastleigh in the April operation were released with an order to report to the refugee camps within two weeks.

On April 9, Somalia’s ambassador to Kenya told journalists that Kenya had deported 82 Somali nationals to Mogadishu, the Somali capital.

Kenya should stop summarily deporting Somali nationals, which risks violating its obligations under Kenyan and international law not to return anyone to situations of persecution or generalized violence. Any undocumented individuals should be given the opportunity to file an application for asylum, Human Rights Watch said.

The Kenyan government should provide full access to staff of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to interview and register asylum claims of undocumented Somalis.

In January, the United Nations refugee agency issued guidelines on returns to Somalia and called on countries not to return anyone before interviewing them and ensuring they do not face the threat of persecution or other serious harm if returned. UNHCR said that Somalia remains “a very dangerous place” and that no Somali national should be “forcibly returned to Somalia unless the returning state is convinced that the persons involved would not be at risk of persecution.”

Human Rights Watch said the Kenyan authorities were obliged to allow UNHCR to register asylum claims from anyone in Kenya, regardless of how long the person had been in Kenya before lodging a claim. Although Kenyan refugee law says an asylum seeker should lodge their claim with the authorities within 30 days of arrival, UNHCR does not impose any such deadline. Somali nationals’ access to UNHCR is all the more important after Kenya suspended all services to urban refugeesa, including registering new asylum seekers, in December 2012.

Kenyan immigration law allows the authorities to regulate who is in Kenya, and Kenya may prevent certain categories of people from entering or remaining in the country, including those deemed to be a security threat.

However, Kenyan and international law prohibit refoulement – forcible return to persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, or to a situation where a person would be at real risk of torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Kenya is also prohibited from returning anyone to a place where their “life, physical integrity, or liberty would be threatened on account of external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public order.”

In its January 2014 guidelines, UNHCR said that it “consider[s] the options for Somalis to find protection from persecution or serious harm within Southern and Central Somalia to be limited,” especially in the large areas that remain under the control of the Islamic militant group Al-Shabaab.

Al-Shabaab has continued to forcibly recruit people into its ranks, including children, and to target individuals perceived to support the Somali government and its partners. On March 5, al-Shabaab publicly executed three alleged spies in Barawe, one of the group’s strongholds.

UNHCR also noted an increase in al-Shabaab attacks in 2013 in Mogadishu that killed civilians. Conflict related injuries in Mogadishu and the southern port town of Kismayo also increased in early 2014.

According to UNHCR, 1.1 million people are currently displaced within Somalia, including 369,000 in Mogadishu. In a March 2013 report, Human Rights Watch found that members of state security forces and armed groups had raped, beaten, and otherwise mistreated displaced Somalis in Mogadishu.A February 2014 Human Rights Watch report documented high levels of rape and sexual abuse against displaced women and girls in the capital throughout 2013.

In other parts of south-central Somalia, a joint military offensive by the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF) against al-Shabaab has resulted in new internal displacement, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

Foreign donors to Kenya and UNHCR should vigorously and publicly oppose summary deportations of Somalis, Human Rights Watch said.

“Kenya’s summary deportation of Somali nationals should end,” Simpson said. “Undocumented people should be given the opportunity to file an asylum application rather than being summarily deported back to the dangers of south-central Somalia.”